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INTRODUCTION
Public administration is the process of fulfillment or
execution of the policies and programs which policy makers per-
ceive are necessary in the service of society. Public adminis-
trators, then, are those delegated the responsibility of putting
into effect policies which other croups legislate. But this does
not mean that administrators themselves have no policy making
power, Appleby has pointed out that:
Administrators are continually laying down rules
for the future, and administrators are continually
determining what the law is, what it means in terms
of action, what the rights of parties are with respect
both to transactions in process and transactions in
prospect.*
Thus, administrators have a wide range of activities to co-
ordinate. At one extreme they interpret the policies made by
other groups, and at the other they apply these interpretations
to current situations. Between these extremes the administra-
tors must make decisions about which regulations apply to each
situation, It is in this range that the true responsibility of
public administration lies.
Gaus has justified this delegation of authority to adminis-
trators as follows
:
It is, indeed, because we wish to have the advant-
age of the special knowledge of experience of experts,
and the simplicity and economy of investigation and
procedure of the administrative agency, that we have
1
Paul H, Appleby, Policy and Administration , p, 7.
turned over many problems of regulation to the admin-
istrative tribunals. Thus there has grown up a wide
area of discretion in which the finality of decision
the administrative authority is accepted. 1
It is because of the specialized knowledge which administrators
have, and the impossibility that legislators can have similar
knowledge of a wide range of problems, that responsibility is
delegated to them. This places upon administrators a responsi-
bility similar to that of legislators to serve the public to
the best of their knowledge and ability. Unless this burden of
responsibility is realized and fully accepted by administrators,
they may fail to achieve the Intent of the legislators when turn-
ing policies into action programs. If this occurs, the public
will not be served to their best interests.
In a free and representative democracy, this administrative
responsibility is felt to be most properly carried by individuals
or groups acquainted with the local situation. Thus, for many
decades the road building program was carried out by administra-
tors on the township level of government; later it was trans-
ferred to the county when it was shown conclusively that this
group was more able to execute these programs satisfactorily.
In local areas, public programs affect individuals and
groups directly. These programs have a different effect on the
public than does an Indirect program such as government inspec-
tion of foods and drugs. A program with a direct approach carries
a different kind of responsibility with it than does an indirect
John M. Gaus, The Frontiers of Public Administration , p. 28.
program. The amount of participation in a program of direct
con-
tact with the public is greatly dependent upon the trust and
confidence which this public places in the administration. Thus,
the success of the program is dependent upon the administrators'
successfully conveying an acceptance of responsibility and trust
as well as successfully interpreting and executing policies
and
programs. Gaus and Wolcott have pointed this out:
It is in the local area that the need for ulti-
mate coordination of programs is createst. All nation-
al, regional, and state efforts should be undertaken
with this fact in mind so far as is humanly possible.
Public programs and their administrators represent to indi-
viduals what their government is and what it stands for; it is
important for local public administrators to accept this fact.
Thus, individuals, "created equal" under the Constitution, must
be treated in a fair and equitable manner without regard to race,
creed, or color, or economic circumstance. Policies and programs
should be so adjusted as to affect individuals in similar cir-
cumstances in a fairly uniform fashion.
It is to local administration and administrators that this
study is directed. For the past three decades, federal programs
for agriculture have reached out to the individual farm to limit
production, maintain prices, or conserve resources. Overall
policy has been determined at the national level, but the pro-
grams have been administered on a county by county and farm by
farm basis. To carry out this task within the framework of the
John H. Gaus and Leon 0. Wolcott, Public Administration
and the United States Department of Agriculture , p. 385.
theory and practice of local self-government, the fanner commit-
tee system was established. This system of administration came
Into being when the first AAA program was established in 1933.
M. L. Wilson, an early administrator of the AAA, later stated:
The first question that was raised was, since
it would touch all farmers, would it be possible to
administer. In the discussion at that time both by
committees of Congress and by others on the outside
who are interested, the great question was raised
that you never could administer or if you did ad-
minister it you would have what we would call hordes
of bureaucrats representing the Government dealing
with farmers.
Now it was under those circumstances that this
idea of administering a program of the Federal Gov-
ernment with farmers through a committee system ori -
inated, and my recollection is of hearings before mem-
bers of committees of Congress and the discussion
among farm organizations and otherwise, was to take a
leaf out of the book of cooperatives, that the coopera-
tives was a democratic institution, and that these pro-
grams are really partnership programs with the Federal
Government in which the Federal Government was doing
certain things for the farmers of the country, and that
there were obligations on both sides, and that by con-
ceiving this as a partnership and conceiving this as a
cooperative in essence, you said to the farmers of a
county: 'Those ivho participate in this program form
a cooperative .
'
1
Elected boards, now called Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation (ASC) committees, administer federal farm programs,
making local program decisions within the framework of policies
established by Congress, by the Secretary of Agriculture, and by
State Committees.
1
United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings . Administration of
jm^Tv. Programs by Farmer Committees . o4i,n uongress, 1st
and 2nd Cessions, p. 3^.
The county A3C committee lias three farmer-members, elected
annually. All persons In the county having an interest in a
farm as owner, tenant, or sharecropper are eligible to vote. To
hold office as a committeeman, a farmer must be eligible to vote
in the committee elections, reside in the county, and meet cer-
tain other minimum requirements designed primarily to insure that
political activity is not involved in committee decisions or op-
erations. About 90,000 farmers serve annually as committee mem-
bers in the United States. They carry a large measure of respon-
sibility in seeing that the farm programs are administered
effectively at the local level.
PURPOSE OF STUDY
The general aim of this study is to discover some of the
problems the successes and failures-?--of selected farmer com-
mittees which administer federal farm programs in order to help
appraise their role in future farm programs. The first network
of farmer committees was established to handle the farm programs
of the 1930' 3i Hardin has explained one of the reasons for this
as follows
:
...a vast amount of help was needed to sign up
millions of farmers, inspect their fields, and certi-
fy them for payments. In the south, county agents
appointed farmer committees to assist in local admin-
istration. In the midwest, producer' control associa-
tions were formed from committeemen elected by farmers.
Elections spread, and in 1936 the Congress directed
the Secretary (of Agriculture) to employ local and
state committees to administer the program. 1
Charles ti. Hardin, The Politics of Arri culture , -op. I? -
116.
6The farmer committee system was thus born out of need and was:
...characterized by two important concepts:
(1) The democratic process of •lectins committeemen
in counties and communities, and (2) the belief that
the person best able to administer a farm program
In the most practical way, with the most beneficial
long term results, is the farmer himself. 1
The system has survived through many administrative reorganiza-
tions, as Hardin points out:
The committee system remained as the AAA
(Agriculture Adjustment Administration) through
some ten organizations from 1933 to the creation
of the P1IA In 19 ;:5. The letters AAA were probab-
ly dropped In 1945 in order to deprive the agency
of an important symbol and thus to diminish its
political influence, 2
,/ithin this statement Hardin also suggests one of the problems
arising out of an organization as large as the farmer committee
system. It van a potential political force '..'1th a network of
membership which reached into all corners of the nation* The
power which it controlled in handling farm programs made it an
entity to : ,o watched. It was watched closely, Hardin points out,
as attested by the ten reorganizations in the twelve years from
1933 to 19*5«
But along with its problems, the system has also been looked
upon as extremely successful. Senator Aiken has pointed out some
of the activities which it has handled In the past:
ot only have they 3crved to administer the crop
adjustments and the Agricultural Conservation Program
1
United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
rlculture and Forestry, Hearings . Administration of Farm
Pro '-rams , 84th Congress 2nd Session, September 10, 1956
,
P. 2,
2
Charles II, Hardin, The Politics of Arrl culture , p, 116.
but during World War II and the Jiorean Affair these
men v/ere agricultural lead Uo assisted in admin-
istering the wartime activities of the Department of
Agriculture. The local offices became centers of
information for producers, encouraging them to in-
crease production to meet production goals* State,
county, and community committeemen played a vital
role in a host of emergency measures ranging from the
distribution of vital information to the rationing of
supplies and promoting war bond drives in rural com-
munities. 1
Thus, the farmer committee system has enjoyed a long tenure
of success. This success has not be Ithout controversy or
change, however. As late as 1954 provisions for conducting com-
mittee elections were amended to remove the power of incumbent
committees to conduct the elections for the succeeding year.
This change was reported to have been made because of numerous
complaints received by the Department of Agriculture that the
local elections tended to perpetuate the committeemen already in
office. Regulations were amended to place the handling of elec-
tions in the hands of an independent election board, 2 a procedure
which has 3ince been a source of controversy.
3
The committee system's ability to conduct farm programs
seemed to be adequate during the first two decades of federally
sponsored programs for agriculture. Farm programs, tiiough new,
were relatively simple and not very restrictive of farm operations,
T~
United States Congressional Record , 36th Congress, 2nd
Session, June 10, I960, Vol. 106, o. 11449.
2
United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings , Administration of Farm
Programs b£ Farmer Committ ees, r'4th Con "res s, 1st and 2nd
Sessions, p.T~"
3
Ibid.
8During the 1930* s, the programs were either of an emergency na-
ture, or were based on soil conservation, with the committees
supervising federal payments to farmers for soil conserving prac-
tices* In the 1940's the main emphasis turned to increasing pro-
duction for the war effort. It was not until the middle 1950*
s
that farm surpluses began to be an extremely difficult proble ,
and the possibility of effective control over farm production
loomed as a possibility for the future. The Soil -Sank, begun in
1956, added a complex new program to the long-standing acreage
allotment and price support operations. This trend to even more
stringent and complex pi continue in the .'. ' s if
farm productive capacity continues high and if down ;ard pressure
on farm prices becomes more intense.
The possibility of broad expansion of land retirement pro-
•ams and of making administrative distinctions among regions was
suggested by President Eisenhower in his budget message to Congress
for the 1961 fiscal year:
Authority to bring additional land into the
Conservation Reserve expires after Vat i960 crop
year* Legislation is proposed to extend this
authority" through the 1963 crop year and to expand
the pro grain by increasing the basic limitation on
the amount o:r ent that may be made in any calen-
dar year from "450 million to 650 million* Specific
authority will be requested for the Secretary of
Agriculture to give special considerations, In al-
locating conservation reserve funds, to those States
and regions where curtailment of production of wheat
or other surplus commodities is consistent with lo'
range conservation and production-adjustment .<
1
Bureau of the Budg
ment of the Fiscal 'i
•*» The '/ud.-et of the United tates Govern-
Year 'ing June jX), 1961 , p. 145*
If such programs continue and expand as part of federal farm pol-
icy and possibly even more complex pro-rams, the need for capable
administration at the local level will be even greater. It is
to examine this level of administration that this study was under-
taken, in hopes of contributing toward, an appraisal of the capa-
city of local administration to handle future farm programs.
POSTWAR FARM SURPLUSES
Even before the Second World War, there were clear warnings
of trouble with the agricultural programs. Surpluses were build-
ing up in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) hands, and only the
war prevented extreme accumulation of stocks and a possible
breakdown of the agricultural program. The need for postwar relief
prevented surplus accumulation in the late 1940' s, but by 1950
large quantities of storable commodities had again accumulated,
as the farm economy geared to war needs proved too productive for
peacetime demands, and as price supports were continued without
adequate production controls. Added to thl3 were several years
of above average weather and rapid adoption of new technologies,
both tending to increase the average yield per acre of crops.
The initial postwar effort to revise the farm program and
thus to avoid excessive stocks and resulting high costs, was the
Agricultural Act of 1948. Flexible price supports, which vary
depending upon the carry-over of stocks from the previous year,
were included in the Act. The greater the surplus carry-over, the
lower the price support level was to be for the next year's crop.
10
Thus, the lower price was supposed to lower the quantity subse-
quently produced. But these lower supports were initially not
to become effective until January of 1950.
The 1948 Act had been an election year bill, passed by a
Republican controlled Congress. Government leadership changed
somewhat, later that year; the new administration felt there was
no assurance that flexible supports were capable of reducing out-
put. Thus, 19^9 legislation continued fixed support prices
through 1954. Growth of stocks was held down by the extreme de-
mands of the Korean War from 1950 through 1953. After the war
ended, the buildup of surpluses began again, precipitating a ma-
jor controversy by 196O.I
The Agricultural Act of 1954 provided once more for price
supports reared to carry-overs, beginning with the 1955 crop. 2
The national acreage allotment for wheat was also reduced. But
even with lower prices and smaller acreages, surpluses of certain
basic crops continued to be produced, as shown in Figure 1, By
late 1955 there was a general concensus among economists and in
overnment that other measures must be taken if overproduction
was to be ended. One of the main items on the agenda of Congress
1
History of farm policies and programs is from Benedict's,
Farm Policies of the United States
. 1790-1950 .
2
.mrray R. Benedict and Oscar C. Stine, The Agricultural
Commodity Programs , p. 126,
11
Stocks of Most Storable Products
Again Increase in 1955
Wheat
(MIL. BU.)
1,040
Cotton
(THOUS. BALES)
13,000
Corn
MIL. BU.)
Food
Fats Cr Oils
(Mil. LBS.)
1952 '54 "56 1952 54 '56 1952 '54 '56 1952 '54 '56
Figure 1. Carryover of major commodities, 1952 through 1956. 1
House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee
on Agri culture , part 1, February 21 and 22, 1956, p. 17.
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early in 1956 was a revival of land removal programs, somewhat
reminiscent of the AAA program of 1933.
That program included, among other provisions, authority for
the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into voluntary agreements
with farmers to reduce acreages of basic crops. For agreeing to
reduce production, the farmer received supplementary income pay-
ments from the federal government, related to the amount of land
not harvested. This program operated until the Supreme Court
invalidated it on January 6, 1936. After this blow to agricul-
tural policy, main reliance for federal aid to agriculture was
placed on soil conservation payments for several years. By 1956,
the farm surplus crisis was serious enough to cause Congress to
make another try at land retirement and the difficult administra-
tive problems connected with it.
THE SOIL BANK
On January 9, 1956, President Dwight D. Elsenhower, in his
message to Congress, proposed the establishment of a Soil Bank. 1 '
To implement the recommendations of the President, bills were in-
troduced In both houses of Congress during the second session of
the 84th Congress. Hearings were held on these bills by the com-
mittees designing agricultural policy for both the House and the
Senate. These hearings resulted in the introduction and the pass-
age of a bill, HR 10875 t known officially as the "Agricultural
1
House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, Hear-
ings , General Farm Legislation , part 1, 84th Congress,
2nd Session, p. 3. Summarization of Presidents message
by Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson.
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Act of 1956." This bill was signed by the President, and became
Public Lav; 540 on May 28, 1956.
Title One of this bill was known as the Soil J3ank Act. This
was broken down into two parts, subtitles (a) and (b), known re-
spectively as the Acreage Reserve and the Conservation Reserve
programs
.
Under the Acreage Reserve program, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture was authorized to formulate and carry out a program for the
1956-1959 crops of wheat, cotton, corn produced in the commercial
corn producing area, peanuts, rice, and certain types of tobacco.
Under this program, producers v:ould be compensated for reducing
their acreage of the commodity below their farm acreage allot-
ment or their farm base acreage, whichever would be applicable.
To be eligible for such compensation, the producer was required to:
1. duce his acreage of the commodity below
his farm acreage allotment
2. Specifically designate the acreage so with-
drawn from the production of such commodity
3. Bet harvest any crop from, or graze this
acreage without permission from the Sec-
retary of Agriculture.
Participants were to be compensated through the issuance of
negotiable certificates, redeemable by the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration in cash, or at the option of the holder, in grain within
the limits prescribed by the Secretary. Compensation under this
program was withheld until it was definitely established that the
producer had fulfilled his share of the contract. Contracts under
the Acreage Reserve were for one year*s duration only.
14
Subtitle (b) , called the Conservation Reserve, was a longer-
run program designed partly to promote conservation of resources.
Under this section, the Secretary was authorized to enter into
contracts for periods of not less that three years. These con-
tracts bound producers to:
1. Establish and maintain protective, vegetative
cover for the contract period
2. Harvest no crop from the acreage diverted
3. Not graze this acreage unless permission
is granted from the Secretary.
In return for such agreements by the producer, the Secre-
tary agreed to
:
1. Bear such part of the cost as he deems
necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this program
2. ilake an annual payment to the producer for
the term of the contract. The rates of
payment were to be established by the Sec-
retary and were to provide a fair and
reasonable return on the land under the
contract.
Purpose of Soil Bank
The acreage reserve was designed as a temporary program to
halt the increase of supplies of the basic commodities held by
the government. This over-supply was felt by the administration
to be a temporary situation brought on by governmental interven-
tion in the agricultural economy, especially by the price sup-
port program,
The purpose of"the Conservation Reserve was of a longer-run
nature. Contracts under this portion were for a period of from
15
three to ten years. Since this portion covered only non-basic
crops in the original bill, it could not be expected to solve the
surplus situation, except in indirect way3. The over-all purpose
is stated in the bill:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Congress and the purpose of the title to protect and
increase farm income, to protect the national soil,
water, and forest and wildlife resources from waste
and depletion, to protect interstate and foreign
commerce from the burden and obstructions which
result from the utilization of farmlands for the pro-
duction of excesnlve supplies of agricultural com-
modities, and to provide for the conservation of such
resources and an adequate, balanced, and orderly
flow of such acrl cultural commodities in Interstate
and foreign commerce. 1
One of the ultimate purposes of the bill was production ad-
justment. It Is to this element of the program that later case
studies are directed. The continued growth of surpluses, despite
efforts of Congress and the USDA, was beginning; to worry Congress-
men, Some feared that unless drastic action was taken on the
part of Congress, public opinion would turn against the farmer.
Jith the advent of the Soil Bank, many legislators felt that here
was the answer, conservation of resources while removing the tre-
mendous surpluses which hovered over the market, holding down
prices of agricultural commodities.
When the bills were discussed in Congress, definite ideas
were aired as to the amount of land it would be necessary to
remove in the acreage reserve program if the correction of sur-
pluses was to take place. Following are figures of the goals
1
Ibid
. , p. 138.
16
which were specified at that time:
Table 1. Acreage to be removed under acreage reserve
program to correct the overproduction of
certain basic crops.
Crop : 1956 1 i 19572
( illions of Acres)
Cotton >5 3.5-4.5
Wheat 12-15 12-15
Corn 4-6 4.5-5.5
Rice »3 « 2
1
House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee
on Agriculture , part 1, February 21 and 22, 1956, p. 4.
2
House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Hearings . Department of Ar.ri culture
Appropriations for 1958 . 85th Congress, lot Session, part 6,
p. 214.
Although the greater part of the acreage goals specified were
removed from production, the buildup of surpluses continued un-
abated. Various reasons have been given for this, as discussed
in the following pages.
The Soil Bank in Action
Contracts for placing land in the soil bank were initiated
following passage of the bill in May of 1956. Although it was
quite late in the 1956 crop year, contracts were offered to
farmers to place land which had been planted to major crops in the
soil bank program. For example, although wheat harvest in much
of the Great Plains area was less than a month away, the Agricul-
ture Department through local county ASC offices set up the pro-
17
gram to bring land then In wheat into the soil bank. Any farmer
who entered the program was required to destroy the crop which
was growing on the land placed in the program, A major factor
which entered in administering the program was the severe drought
in the Great Plains area. The regulations sent to each county
contained provision for drought situations; a rate of -6 per acre
was set for this land, These same regulations also had provisions
for estimating the value of the crop on the land and paying a
rate according to the value of the crop or the productivity of the
land. It was left to the individual county committee to decide
which regulations applied to the situation.
Research on the soil bank program was carried out at Kansas
State University late in 1957 and early in 1958 by Schnlttker
and Smythe, They estimated that wheat not produced because of
the acreage reserve in various areas of Kansas cost the federal
;;overnraent from |»85 to as high as ,,10.70 per bushel. The esti-
mated cost per bushel depended upon the amount of rainfall in dif-
ferent localities in 1956 and the yield result of the 1957 crop.
Eastern Kansas, for example, had the lowest estimated rate per
bushel reduction U),85), but It also had the lowest percentage
(9.7/;) of wheat allotment placed in the acreage reserve. 'Western
Kansas had the highest estimated rate (; 10.70), and also it had
the highest percentage (74,5;!) of total allotment placed in the
program. 1 It can be seen that the program bought reduced produc-
1
John A, Schnlttker and Patrick E. Smythe, An Appraisal of
the Acrea o Reserve Program for ..heat , Agricultural Econom-
ics Report Mo. 79, March, 19557 P. 14
18
tion at a high price in some areas. Schnlttker and Smythe stated:
Certainly the Joil Bank money v.as a welcome addition
to the incomes of western Jianaas Farmers and to the whole
Great Plains' economy. Bttt the stated Intent of Congress
was to buy production adjustment, not to provide drought
relief. Pro; rams of tills nature, with effects scarcely
related to apparent intent, do not breed public confi-
dence in farmers, their representatives, or in public
administrators ,
1
Another possible reason the soil bank has failed to achieve
the stated intent of Congress is due to certain key regulations
not being Implemented. Isolated examples of such happenings have
appeared, but as far as is known these are not a widespread pheno-
mena. For instance, the Casa Grande Valley Country Club of Ari-
zona early in 1957 received a cotton allotment and placed this
acreage in the 1957 acreage reserve program. In February of 1957,
upon instructions from Washington, the Club's cotton allotment
was cancelled, since no cotton had been planted o tj A land for
the past three years, a requirement of soil bank regulations.
In April, 1957, the latter action was rescinded by the Arizona
State Office, and the Club was given the allotment which it again
placed in the acreage reserve for a compensation of > 2,362.50.
In October, 1957, the Commodity Stabilization Service (CSS) of
V/ashlngton instructed the State ASC office to cancel the allot-
ment and soil bank agreement. Although no payment was finally
made, the question could be posed, " (ho 1 ~ued the allotment in
the first place?" and "Who was responsible for the pressure which
caused the State ASC committee to reverse the instructions from
1
Ibid., pp. 12, 14.
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CSS, Washington?" This Is an example of public administrators
failing to serve the public which elected them and who expected
these men to serve honestly to the best of their ability.
A second similar affair was found in the Arizona cotton pro-
gram. In this instance, one producer In Arizona was allowed to
place Ms total acreage allotment of 1404 acres In the acreage
reserve. For this he received 0214,983.80 in compensation.
While he contributed to a reduotlon of surpluses by this measure,
as president of another firm he planted 4,639.5 acres of cotton
on land which had no acreage allotment. The report for 1957
states
:
The 1957 (Acreage Reserve Program) regulations
provide: 'No producer entering into an agreement
with the Secretary hereunder shall employ any scheme
or device which would tend to defeat the purpose of
the government .
'
1
However, this did not stop this producer from completely bypassing
the original purpose of the soil bank by using a technicality in
another provision of the Agricultural Act, which permitted him to
pay a relatively small penalty for producing the cotton without
benefit of an acreage allotment. While he was nullifying the pur-
pose of the soil bank, he benefited as the recipient of the lar-
gest payment made in 1957 under the cotton program.
Although regulations existed which might have been sufficient
to deter any producer from thwarting the purposes of the soil bank,
1
House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Hearings , Department of Agriculture
Appropriations for Iff % 85th Congress , "2nd Session, part \
p. 297.
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in the case cited the reflations were not enforced. Thus, the
program did not bring about the production adjustment v/hich its
proponents expected. However, it is questionable if it was an
inherent fault of the program itself, or a fault at level of ad-
ministration.
A different type of disparity, although nonetheless impor-
tant, was found in the acreage reserve program for 1956 in North
and South Dakota. Both these states were hard-hit by the drought
of previous years. Yet, for the 195<S acreage reserve program for
wheat, the two states fared differently, A report early in 1957
stated
:
Officials of South Dakota questioned the disparity
between the rates per acre paid under the ARP in that
state as compared to its neighbor, North Dakota, Records
indicate that the average payment per acre for wheat in
North Dakota (£14,13) was approximately double that of
South Dakota ( ,7.32). Host of payments in South Dakota
were at $6*00 minimum rate for failed crops; whereas in
North Dakota "desk appraisals" were made assumin ood
weather and normal growing conditions at time of appraisals, 1
Considering that it was June 8, 1956, before the program was in-
itiated, the probable yields of any wheat could have been esti-
mated for ;the harvest just a few weeks away. Administrators in
these two cases handled similar problems in very different fash-
ions.
These are some examples of the type of deviations which arose
under the administration of the soil bank program for previous
years. Some and possibly all this error was accidental or due to
1
House of Representatives, Subcommtttee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Hearings
. Department of . ,;ri culture
Appropriations for 1958 . 85th Congress, 1st Session, part 6,
p. 145.
21
natural human variation when surrounded by different situations.
It is possible that these failures were caused by lack of commun-
ication from the Federal Department of Agriculture through the
state ASC offices to the local farmer committee administrators.
But it Is apparent that many of these deviations were at the local
level..
Since the effectiveness of local administration Is the sub-
ject of this study, the case studies conducted lie in this area.
The objective Is to determine the extent to which the production
adjustment aspect of the conservation reserve (CR) program was
achieved. In order to attain this objective, a two county study
of the I960 conservation reserve program and Its administration
has been undertaken. The specific hypothesis studied is that the
conservation reserve program has achieved a reduction In production
comparable to the co3t of operating the program,
CASE STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONSERVATION RESERVE
Before beginning the actual case studies it is necessary to
gain a conception of how the program was placed in action and some
of the regulations pertaining to the conservation reserve program
for I960. These regulations were conceived in the Agriculture
Department in Washington and then sent to the state ASC offices.
These offices sent a copy of these regulations to each county ASC
office for use by the local committee In administering this pro-
gram. Thus all atate and county offices received identical regu-
lations and instructions on how to administer the program.
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To acquaint county committees with these regulations, region-
al meetings were held during August, 1959, at which state ASC
representatives presented the procedures to be followed in plac-
ing the program in action. These meetings were designed to remove
much of the differences in interpretation of the regulations by
individual committees, and thus, the program would be more uni-
formly administered. These explanatory meeting, together with
the regulations which each county received, gave all committees
the same base from which to initiate the program.
The Regulations
The local committee^ first task under this program was to
place on each farm in the county a productivity rating. Regula-
tions pertaining to this task state:
1. The county committee shall identify an
adequate number of farms which are of
average productivity for the county to
enable them to adequately assess the
typical county average farm. Such farms
shall be assigned a productivity index
of 100 per cent.
2. The simple average for all such farms in the
county shall be between 99 and 100 per cent. 1
So that the committees would thoroughly understand what the index
was to contain and how to set it up, the regulations further
stated:
It is intended that the indexes established by
the county committee shall be Judgement ratings
1
United States Department of Agriculture, Reference Handbook
No. 1-S. B. . Conservation Reserve Program Re ulations, part 17,
p. 1$17
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taking Into consideration the opinions of those
taking part in the ratings and the committee's
general knowledge of the farms involved. ...it
is intended that the indexes fairly represent the
relative productivity of the farms. The county
committee shall take into consideration any other
facts available to it including:
(a) Available yield data, including data
furnished by the farmer
(b) Land classification suitability data
(c) Soil Survey information. 1
By following these instructions and using the available data,
the committee placed an index value on each farm in the county.
With the index, a rental rate was set by multiplying the farm
index by the county average rental rate. For example, if the
county average per acre rental rate was 10 and the farm produc-
tivity index number was 120, the value placed on the farm was 12
per acre. This was the amount offered to the operator if he placed
only a part of his land In the prosram. However, if he placed his
total farm in the program, he was offered an additional ten per
cent bonus. This original value was the amount offered for a
farm of a certain productivity; if a plot from any farm was of-
fered for the program, a performance supervisor Inspected the
plot to determine if it was of a productivity equal to the rest
of the farm. If such a plot was not of an equal productivity
when compared to the remaining part of the farm, the performance
supervisor was to lower the index value for that plot by an amount
related to its productivity.
1
Ibid., p. 166.
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To place land in the program, the farmer was required to of-
fer hi a land for rental at a price which was at least ten cents
under the amount offered by the committee. This requirement was
designed to encourage farmers to bid their land into the program
at near the same net return as would be forth coming if the land
was farmed. A second encouragement for the farmer to do this ivas
the fact that if he bid too high and others bid under him, he
could possibly be left out of the program if there were not suf-
ficient funds to cover all land offered for rental. This provided
an incentive for farmers to offer their land at rates comparable
to the net returns from farming.
With such a system of checks and incentives, the payment under
the program was to represent the potential net returns from farm-
ing the land placed in the program. Such payment was to cover
the net return to the land and represented no return to cover any
cost of labor or other variable inputs of farming.
Once the committee completed indexing the farms in the county,
it was a relatively simple matter to put the program into action.
Contracts were signed with farmers who agreed to place their
land under the program. The farmer was subjected to certain re-
quirements, such as planting a cover crop for which costs were
shared; in return, he received a yearly rental fee for the dura-
tion of the contract.
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Methodology of Case Studies
The appraisal, which was carried out to determine how effec-
tively the program is achieving production adjustment, followed
much the same procedure the committee initiated when placing it
in action. Data were obtained concerning individual contracts
from the local ASC offices. These data Included the legal des-
cription of the farm, a map of each farm displaying the plots
placed in the program, and the productivity rating given the plots
or farms placed in the conservation reserve.
Three methods of comparison to determine the potential pro-
ductivity of the land placed under the program were used—soil
maps, a personal appraisal, and value of the land from tax
records. By use of these methods, the value of the payment under
the conservation reserve program was compared with the potential
productivity of the land.
CLAY COUNTY
Clay County issued seventeen contracts for the i960 conser-
vation reserve program. Total funds for this program were spent,
and one operator who offered land was turned down due to this lack
of funds. Several of the contracts signed approached the | 5000
limitation placed on any one operator by the program.
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oil Map Comparisons
3oil maps of Clay County show generalized classes of land
with the relative degree of care or management required for safe
and permanent use. Each class is broken down to show whether, in
general, the soils are tight, sandy, stony, or of some other com-
bination. There are seven classes of land, with classes one through
four suitable for cultivation and with conservation practices
ranging from no special practices to limited use and intensive
care of the soil. Classes five through seven are not suitable for
cultivation, but they are usable for grazing or woodland. (There
was no class five land in Clay County.)
Comparin;; the farms placed in the conservation reserve program
on these maps, twelve were of class three land, which is suitable
for cultivation with intensive conservation practices. Five farms
were of class four rating, which suggests limited use as well as
Intensive soil practices; one contract included class six land,
which, according to the maps, Is not suitable for cultivation.
Table 2 is a comparison of the class of land in the farm with the
productivity index number given the farms under the conservation
reserve program.
The regulations for the conservation reserve program stated
that soil maps were to be consulted In setting the productivity
index. If this were done, the index established should vary accord-
ing to the nap. Land with a class three rating should have a high-
er index value than does class four land; as is revealed in the
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table, there is no trend established in this direction. Class
four land is rated 95 for two farms and 100 for three farms, while
Table 2. Class of land and productivity rating of
farms placed in Clay County I960 Conservation
eserve Program*
Farm number Class of land Productivity
index number
5, 6
2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 17
11, U, 15
1, 16
4, 8
3, 13
3
3
4
3
4
3
105
100
100
95
95
85
some class three land is given even a lower index value of 85,
Effectiveness of cultivation, degree of erosion, and other fac«
tors may account for such variations.
Personal Observation of Farms
A visit to the farms entered in the I960 conservation reserve
program was quite helpful in verifying results of the soil map
comparisons as well as bringing out some new discoveries. Almost
all the land observed was rolling upland with a very limited
depth of topsoil; this factor verified the class three and four
ratings of the soil maps. Only one farm was rated as significant-
ly above average in productivity (index considerably above 100)
,
and this farm was withdrawn from the program several months after
the farmer signed the original contract. This action was com-
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pleted by making a special appeal to the Department of Agriculture
in Washington,
Examples of land of extremely poor productivity were farms
3, 11, and 13, Farm number six appeared to be about average pro-
ductivity for the county, but the plots placed in the program were
extremely hilly upland and represented the poorer land in the farm.
The index value given this farm was lowered 1 5 per cent by the per-
formance supervisor. Although this action taken by the perform-
ance supervisor was a step in the right direction, the conclusion
of the researcher after his visit to the farms was that the 15
per cent lower index value given the plot was not sufficient to
show the difference in productivity between most of the land in the
farm and the contracted acreage. Farm number twelve was another
rolling, heavily ditched farm which did not appear to be of aver-
age productivity for the county although an index value of 100 was
placed on It,
Some examples of farms of more nearly average productivity
were farms 4, 7, 9, and 14, These farms generally were of less
slope, had better soil characteristics, and more nearly approached
the average value placed on the land by the committee.
The general conclusion drawn from the personal visits is that
most of the land placed in the program in Clay County is of lower
than average productivity for the county and would give low net
returns from farming. The range of index values placed on this
land is extremely narrow as compared to the variation observed in
the land. Thus, farms four and fourteen are probably worth the
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Index value of 100, but the index value of 85 placed on farms
three and thirteen was not sufficiently lower to show their actual
relative productivity.
Appraised Value of Farms
A comparison was also made of the conservation reserve pay-
ment with the appraised value of the contracted land. Clay County
had just completed an appraisal and had current 100 per cent val-
uations on all property. Land values, however, represent chiefly
the discounted expected net return to land as a factor of pro-
duction, not discounted net returns from all factors used in pro-
duction. While the conservation reserve program is a land rental
program, it must also compensate the producer for expected net
returns from other farm resources used on land, if it is to be
attractive to producers.
It is likely, however, that land prices are also a reason-
ably good indicator of expected gross production from cultivati
different qualities of land. It was mainly gross production which
the county committees were Instructed to assess in setting rent-
al rates per acre. It is of interest, therefore, to compare valua-
tions and rental rates on conservation reserve tracts.
In Table 3» it is seen that the conservation reserve rate per
acre is much lower as a per cent of land value on highly produc-
tive land (9,3%) than on lower quality land (16.1^). If the pro-
gram were bidding against gross returns as crudely measured by
land values, low quality land would be attracted most readily.
Instead, the conservation reserve rental rate is probably weighed
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Table 3. Clay County comparisons.
Farm
Number
•
*
•
*
•
•
•
:
:
:
:
•
Productivity
Index iiumber
Set by Farmer
Committees
• 100 aluation
i Per Acre of
I Land Only
I
•
•
•
•
•
•
I
:
•
•
»
Conser-
vation
Reserve
Payment.
Per Acre
Conser-
i vation
; Reserve
: Payment
i as Per
Cent of
: Land Val-
: ue
19* 125 1-7.15 17.50 9.3
15* 120 112.91 16.80 14.9
6- 105 92.63 14.70 11.6
5 105 67.55 14.70 21.8
7 100 105.33 14.00 13.3
r 100 89.43 14.00 15.6
2 100 88.04 1 .00 15.9
9 100 87.64 14.00 16.0
11 100 86.81 14.00 16.1
12 100 82.10 14.00 17.1
16 100 75.62 1 .00 18.5
14 100 65.83 14.00 21.2
10 100 63.17 .00 22.2
4 95 106.48 13.30 12.5
17 95 104.75 r .30 12.7
1 95 96.70 13.30 13.3
8 95 76.19 13.30 17.6
13 BS 36.13 11.90 13.8
3 85 76.39 11.90 15.6
KFarms not placed in the conservation reserve program
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against expected net returns to all resources used in production.
Such expected net returns would normally be greater from cultiva-
ting highly productive land than from cultivating unproductive
(low-priced) land in a similar fashion. Therefore, a much wider
range of payment rates would be required to either match gross
land productivity as indicated by land values, or to match expect-
ed net income from different qualities of land as indicated by,
theory and experience.
Returning to Table 3, it is lnterestin- to note that there
are no farms in the program with a relatively high productivity
rating. If the index properly represents the relative productiv-
ity of the land in the county, it is assumed that land from all
ranges of productivity would be attracted into the program. As
is apparent in Table 3, only farms with a ratin of 105 or below
entered the program. This would seem to further verify the tenta-
tive conclusions above that the alternative offered farmers through
this program was not as attractive for highly productive land in
the county as it was for lower quality land.
If this is true, and the data of Table 3 seem to indicate
that it is, then the committee have failed to set up this index
properly. The instructions, which all county committees received
prior to the setting of this index state: "It is intended that
the indexes... of the farms Involved. . .fairly represent the rela-
tive productivity of these farms." 1 It is the "relative produc-
1
USDA, Reference Handbook ilumber 1-3. 3., Conservation
Program Regulations , part 17, p. 16&.
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tlvity" which is most important; thus, the index value of one farm
should have the same relationship to that farm* a productivity
(presumably gross) as the index value of any other farm has to its
productivity. In the examples shown in Table ~, this is not the
case. The index value of average farms has a different relation-
ship to their productivity than does the index value of highly
productive farms to their productivity, (as Indicated by compar-
ing farm nineteen with any other farms). Thli is shown by the
ranges of the productivity index (column two), and the range of
the valuation per acre (column three). The range of the produc-
tivity index i3 147 per cent, from 85 to 125, while the range of
land values is 297 per cent, from £63.17 per acre to 1 7.15 per
acre. To actually represent the potential productivity of the
land shown by the values placed on the land, the lnde;: would have
had to vary from approximately 60 to 165.
Upon contacting one of the committeemen of Clay County, this
discrepancy was brought out and justification for it was request-
ed. He explained that the index was set up in this manner because
it was felt that very little of the highly productive land would
be placed in the conservation reserve program, regardless of the
payment set. Therefore, rather than set the index very high for
tills type land and set the index low for the poor land in the
county, the committee felt that it would be better to set the in-
dex lower for the good land and hold the index for the poor land
up in order to provide a higher incentive for the poor land to
come into the program. In this way, the index would still balance
out between 99 and 101 per cent.
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This lack of variation In the productivity Index tended to
cause the poorer quality land to be offered too hi h a monetary
incentive for the production adjustment which was achieved if the
land was placed in the program. Some correction of this was possi-
ble, though, with the bid system which farmers were required to
gg through to enter the program . In this county the average price
at which farmers bid their land into the program was &1.14 per
acre below the offered rate. The range was from $3.00 below to
only §.10 bclov;, which was the smallest amount which farmers could
bid below the offered rate and still be considered eligible to
enter the program. It was interesting to note that the farmers
who bid £3.00 under the offered rate were farms 3, 5, and 15
(Table 3) ; this factor tends to point out that these operators
also felt the productivity rating placed on their farm over-
estimated the potential productivity of the land. The greater
majority of farmers tended to bid only a very small amount under
the offered rate, which meant that the bid system contributed
rather insignificantly toward buying production adjustment with
this p*o in Clay County.
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SALIHE COUNTY
Data obtained concerning; the conservation reserve program
for this county showed only nine contracts placing land in the pro-
gram. Total funds allotted for the program were not spent and
some were returned to the Federal Government. The location of
the Saline County farms, productivity index ratings of each, and
a map of the individual plots placed in the conservation reserve
were secured from the county office.
Soil Maps Comparisons
Saline County soil maps represent a thorough soil survey
which was completed in 1959. The land of the county is classed
according to types of soils. For each type soil, a productivity
rating of the two main crops, corn and wheat, is given; such rat-
ings are stated in bushel amounts. (This information is given
in Appendix Table 1).
To determine the productivity of the farms in this county,
the individual farms were located on the soil maps. By taking a
weighted average of the different soil types on each farm, it MM
possible to determine the potential gross productivity of the
farms in bushel amounts, i*et incomes were estimated, subtracting
all variable costs of production, the depreciation cost of the
equipment used to produce the crop, and the cost of seed for the
crop fron gross incomes. These variable costs were obtained from
unpublished data at Kansas State University. The variable costs
calculated per acre of wheat on a 320 acre farm amounted to £7.65.
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These costs include gas, oil, upkeep of equipment, and cost of
labor used in production.
The depreciation coots, or costs of owning the machinery,
were obtained from the 1959 summary and analysis report of the
farm management associations of Kansas. This study gave the in-
vestment cost per acre of machinery for the different types of
farming areas of Kansas. For Area 1, the investment per acre was
§20.71. 3y using a straight line method of depreciation over a
ten year period, a yearly per acre cost figure of ",2.07 can be
derived. This figure gives the cost per acre of the equipment
used to produce a crop of wheat.
The cost of seed wheat was placed at &2.00 per bushel with
a planting rate of one bushel per acre or a total cost per acre
of $2.00 for seed wheat.
By deducting these costs of production from gross income,
it Is possible to estimate a net income figure per acre of land.
This value is the figure producers probably v/eight against the
conservation reserve payment in deciding to contract land under
the program. A comparison of these calculated net returns with
the payment rates under the program should help give some indica-
tion of the effectiveness with which local administrators achieved
the main purpose of the program, production adjustment.
In column one, Table 4, contracted farms are listed by num-
ber. Farm numbers one through nine are farms with at least some
or all of the crop land in the conservation reserve program for
1960, Farms ten through sixteen represent farms of low productiv-
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Table 4. Saline County comparisons.
Farm : Productivity : Appraised: Calculated : Calculated: Cons er-
Number : Index Number : Value Per: Gross Income :Net Income :vatlon
: : Acre : Per Acre :Per Acre :Reserve
: : : : : Payment
: : : : :Per Acre
12* 145 84.86 31.67 21.95 20.30
13* 140 50.00 25.05 15.33 19.60
11* 135 45.31 27.15 17.42 18.90
10* 120 57.10 21.17 11.45 16.80
16* 100 32.50 19.91 10.19 14.00
6 95 30.48 18.90 9.18 13.30
2 80 30.00 19.00 9.28 11.20
5 80 22.18 16.29 6.57 11.20
3 80 21.09 14.66 4.94 11.20
1 80 20.00 16.83 7.11 11.20
7 80 18.75 16.29 6.57 11.20
9 80 18.75 15.38 5.66 11.20
8 75 19.37 14.48 4.76 10.50
4 75 17.92 15.20 5.48 10.50
14* 70 19.06 15.02 5.30 9.80
*Farms not placed in 1960 conservation reserve program
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ity and farms of high productivity in the caunty. They represent
farms chosen at random and are used to compare the productivity
index set by the farmer committee for the extreme ranges of pro-
ductivity with the actual calculated productivity of these farms.
Column two is a productivity index set by the farmer committee,
and It is a percentage figure which represents the value of the
productivity of the land when multiplied by the value of |14 per
acre, the county average net income per acre. (The range of the
Saline County index is much wider than the Clay County index.)
Column three is the appraised value per acre of the farms and
this appraised value will be explained in the next section. Col-
umn four is the calculated gross income per acre of the farms;
column five represents the farms' calculated net incomes. The
conservation reserve payment set for the farms is indicated in
column six,
With the aid of this table, it is possible to draw some con-
clusions concerning the conservation reserve program and its hand-
ling in Saline County. The productivity index (column two) is the
key to buying gross production adjustment with the soil bank pro-
gram. If this index correctly represents the actual production
possibilities of the land in the county, then each dollar spent
for land rental buys about the same decrease in production, re-
gardless of quality of land.
Studying Table 4, it can be seen that the index on farms
shown varies from a low of 70 to a high of 145. This was also the
total variation of the index in Saline County; thus, farm twelve
represents one of the most highly productive farms in the county,
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and farm fourteen, one of the lowest productive farms. Since this
index (column two) is a percentage figure, it is possible to find
the monetary value associated with this index by multiplying the
index number by the payment for average land in the county, £14
per acre. Thus, land with a productivity index number of 145
would be paid C20.J50 per acre (145 x ; 14) under the conservation
reserve program, while the farm with index number 70 would be
paid C9.80 per acre (70 x : 14). This i3 a percentage variation
of 207 per cent.
The method of calculating columns four and five has already
been explained. One point must be remembered with reference to
columns four and five; they are calculated as estimates of aver-
age production over a period of years, rather than any one speci-
fic year. Thus, column five values represent the net return farm-
ers could reasonably expect from farming over a period of several
years.
Comparing column five with six, one point becomes apparent.
For the farms actually in the 1960 conservation reserve program,
the payment is much higher than the calculated net returns to
production (as indicated by land quality) would warrant. Looking
further, it can be noted that the only farms for which the index
has an approximate fit are the higher productivity farms in the
county. For the low productivity farms, the index gives values
much too high when compared to the estimated production possibili-
ties of the land. Looking at farm three (Table 4), it can be seen
that the payment is two and one fourth times the calculated net
39
income for that land. If the estimated production ia accurate,
this is a substantial overpayment for the reduction in production
which was effected by placing this farm in the program and a wind-
fall to the farm operator, who might have contracted for a much
lower rate. Another example of possible overpayment is farm nine;
this farm had a rental value of ,11.20 per acre placed on it, If
it v/ere consigned to the program. This was twice the value of the
calculated net income from this farm. Further examples of possible
overpayment are also apparent in Table 4.
Another measure of the appropriateness of this index is the
range of the two columns. Column five has a range of 414 per
cent, and column six, 207 per cent; thi3 means that the range of
actual productivity is 414 per cent while the conservation re-
serve index range is only 207 per cent. The conclusion drawn is
that the index does not have sufficient variation to cover the
wide variability in Saline County land. Thus, the more produc-
tive land is underpaid and doe3 not enter Into the program, while
the less productive land does come into the program and is overpaid.
Although the index does not appear to have sufficient varia-
tion when net returns are considered, which is actually what the
conservation reserve payments are replacing, if the gross returns
are considered, the variation is more nearly correct. Since the
county committees were instructed to use gross productivity as the
guide in setting up the index, it appears that instructions were
fairly closely followed in this Instance. But this does not mean
that production adjustment of the proper magnitude was achieved
with the funds expended. It does supply reason for the lack of
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variation and the resulting overpayment for poorer quality land.
Tax Appraisal Comparisons
The appraised value of land in the conservation reserve pro-
gram in Saline County is given in Table 4, column three. These
values do not represent the full value of the land, but rather,
are the appraised values which are used as a base to determin
t
the land taxes. Comparing their range with the range of the pay-
ments under the conservation reserve is one method of testing the
range of the program's payments. The ranges should be nearly
equal since both the value set on land and the conservation re-
serve payment are directly connected to the productivity of the
land. The value placed on land is mainly the capitalized value
of the net returns, while the conservation reserve payment is re-
placing the net returns which would result If the land were farmed,
Thus, the ranges of the two croups of values on the same plots of
land should be very similar.
Studying column two, Table 4, the range of the appraised
value of the land is 445 per cent. Column six, the program's
payment, has a range of 207 per cent, less than one half the range
of column two. This factor suggests that the productivity index
does not have sufficient variation to truly represent the varia-
tion In productivity of land in Saline County, unless the range
of appraised values per acre is completely unreasonable.
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Personal Observations and Comparisons
A visit to each farm that had land in the conservation reserve
program of I960 provided a means of verifying the tendencies re-
vealed in the other comparisons. All plots of land in the program
in this county were definitely below the average productivity of
cultivated land in Saline County, an observation which supports
the index number designation somev/hat. Four of the nine contracted
farms or parts of farms v/ere rocky type soils; one farm, number
nine, had rock outcropping which would make it nearly impossible
to farm. Approximately 25 per cent of the land placed in the pro-
gram on this particular farm was of this type soil. Although the
land was given an index value of 80, this over-estimated its pro-
duction possibilities. Some of the land committed to the program
did not appear to be technically eligible to be entered because
it had probably not been farmed in the past three years.
Generalizing on the other farms visited, it was noted that
all were rolling upland with only two farms of fair productivity.
Farms two and six were terraced with a two-to-four per cent slope,
although most of these two farms were pasture land. Farms 1 , 4, and
8 were hilly upland farms which would have a high cost of opera-
tion and a resulting low net return. For the most part, all these
farms were of a very low productivity, and the productivity seems
to have been over-estimated by the payments under the program. If
the productivity index had sufficient variation to cover the actual
variation of the net returns to these farms, the same land might
have been retired at lower cost.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The county committee system has functioned for almost three
decades, handling the farm program at the local level. However,
its function has not been without change; administrative re-
organizations have been relatively frequent. The latest occurred
In the early 1950*s when the regulations covering elections were
changed to provide for an independent election board to conduct
the election of committeemen for the coming year.
County committees functioned quite well in administering the
farm programs during their first two decades. These programs
were relatively simple and easy to administer. With the advent of
the Soil Bank In 1956, the problems of the committees began to in-
crease. The following three years of administering such a program
have emphasized some of the problems of handling programs which
are considerably more complex. With the possibility of even more
involved agricultural programs In the future, the problems of ad-
ministration may be even greater. A conception of one of these
complex programs and the problems associated with it was gained
with the two county study of the 1960 conservation reserve program.
Production adjustment is being achieved with the conservation
reserve program, but the size or amount of this adjustment is diffi-
cult to measure. Of Interest, also, is the cost of achieving re-
duction in total production. Data of these case studies tend to
reveal this cost as greater than necessary for the adjustment
effected. Comparing the rental payments under the program with the
net returns which farmers could reasonably expect from farming the
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land over a period of time, tends to demonstrate that the amount
paid for an acre of land removed from production must be greater
to attract the land to non-use. This is considering only the
economic viewpoint, the net returns which must be replaced. If a
farmer considers more than Just the economic returns when choos-
ing to quit farming, a greater Inducement than just replacing his
net income must necessarily be offered to remove his land from
production. If this is true, possibly the cost of removing this
land from production is not too great. However, from an economic
viewpoint, the type of land removed is receiving a greater pay-
ment than is Justified.
The major cause of this overpayment seems to be a failure of
productivity indexes for which farmer committees are responsible
to reflect satisfactorily gross returns or net returns. The fail-
ure of this index to have sufficient variation to cover the actual
variation in land productivity may result in overpayment on less
productive land. Such land makes up most of the land placed in
the program in the counties studied.
The causes of the insufficient variation in the productivity
Index could be due to many reasons. It is possible that the com-
mittees rely more heavily on the gross returns to the land when
setting this index. These returns would not have as much varia-
tion as would the net returns. Another possibility is that the
committee is subjected to pressures which make it difficult to
distinguish between farms with nearly the same productivity be-
cause of the possibility that the farmer would become quite dis-
turbed when told his farm was not rated as high as his neighbor's.
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To prevent this possibility, the committees may use less varia-
tion when rating farms, and only when farms vary considerably do
they vary the rating placed on the farms,
If more complex land retirement programs are adopted, affect-
ing possibly all or nearly all farms in many regions, the farmer
committee system may face far greater administrative problems
than those previously cited.
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Table 1 . Estimated average acre yield of principal
crops in Saline County, Kansas.
(Yields in columns A obtained under common
practices; those in columns B obtained with
improved management; absence of a yield
figure indicates crop is not commonly grown
under the management level indicated.)
ooil Types Wheat
B
Corn
B
Bu.
Albion loam 10
Albion coarse sandy loam, shal-
low phase— —
Arkansas fine sandy loam — 14
Assaria silt loam————
—
15
Assaria silty clay loam-——
—
12
Benfield silty clay loam, shal-
low phase—— ——
—
7
Benfield 3ilty clay loam 13
Berg silt loam———— — 1
5
Berg silty clay loam- 7
Bonaccord silty clay loam— 16
Bonaccord silty clay loam—Sol-
onetz complex———— 10
Carlson silty clay loam—
Cloud silty clay loam 3
Detroit silt loam 19
Detroit silty clay loam 18
Detroit silt loam, overwashphase———— — 12
Ebenezer silt loam— — 10
Ebenezer silty clay loam— 7
Ebenezer loam— —.—.- 9
Ebenezer silt loam, colluvlal
phase — 13
Edalgo silty loam ———— 6
Elmo silt loam 14
Elmo silty clay loam 1
1
Elmo loam, terrace phase 14
Elmo silt loam, terrace phase-- 14
Englund silt loam— 8
3u. Bu. Bu.
15 17 20
20 35 40
21 25 30
20 17 30
18 12 15
18 20 30
23 25 35
14 -* — mm
24 28
15 16 22
tmmm
7
26 40
m» mm
45
26 35 40
18 25 35
17 14 20
12 10 20
17 11 20
19 20 30
10 12 16
21 25 35
16 20 35
21 32 40
21 35 40
12 13 20
Bu« . ' . Bu.
Englund silty clay loam, very
shallow variant- --
Falun fine sandy loam—
Fore clay————— ~
Fore silty clay loam, deep over
silt
Geary silty loam- 1
Hall silt loam—
Hall silt loam, brown subsoil
variant—
Hallvllle loam
Hallville loam, shallow phase
Hedville loam——-——
—
Hedville stony loam—
—
Hobbs silt loam————
—
Humbarger silt loam— ——
—
Humbarger loam—— ——
Idana silt loan—————
Idana 3ilty clay loam ——
Kipp silt loa^; ——
Klpp silty clay loam— 1
Kipson silt loam ———
Kipson shaly silt loam———
Lancaster loam——— —
Lancaster loam, shallov/ phase—
Lancaster fine sandy loam—
Lancaster fine sandy loam, shal-
lov/ phase—— — —
Langley silt loam— —
Langley silty clay loam
Langley silt loam—Soloneta com-
plex— ———
Lanham silt loam — —
Lincoln loamy fine sand-
Lindsborr silt loam-
Lockhard silt loam—
Lockhard loamy fine sand, over-
blown phase————
Longford silt loam
Longford silty clay loam——
Malmgren silt loam
3 7 — —
16 21 28 35
13 16 15 20
14 18 32 40
13 18 25 35
17 26 35 45
17 26 35 45
8 10 — —
6 8 -- —
15 23
NMfl
30 40
16 23 34 40
15 18 25 35
13 23 20 30
10 18 17 30
12 12 18 20
10 12 17 20
9 11 — —
3 6 mmmm —
10 14 15 30
7 10 12 25
9 13 12 25
7 9 10 20
16 22 35 45
12 22 28 40
11 1E 20 30
6 9 12 20
10 13 15 15
3 5 — —
15 22 25 30
11 16 15 15
15 10 25 30
10 15 15 30
12 16 20 30
11 Types
Bu.
Marydel silt loam 16
Marydel loan, poorly drained var-
iant- —
-
1
.'
Marydel fine sandy loam 15
Marydel loamy fine sand 10
McPherson silt loam , 16
;uir silt loan 16
New Cambria oilty clay loam 16
Niles silt loam 15
Hiles silty clay loam— 12
Ninne3cah silt loan— ——.- 14
Pratt fine sandy loam
—
1 10
tide 3llt loam-
—
13
Rentide silty clay loam— »— 10
Rentlde silt loam, moderately shal-
low phase—-—--—-——.— »«„,««« 7
-0 !:eby silt loan——>— 1———
—
15
Roxbury silty clay loan. 18
Salemburg silt loam————— -.- 15
Shellabarger silt loam———— 13
Shellabarr~er loam- — 12
Dhellabarer fine sandy loam— 10
Smoky Butte silt loam- 15
Smolan 3ilt loam— 14
Solomon clay— 15
Solomon clay, low lime variant— 10
Stimmel silt loam—
>
1 16
Stimmel silty clay loam >- 12
Sutphen silty clay m 16
Tescott silt loam i^
Tescott 3ilty clay loam 8
Tobin silt loan 15
Vernon silty clay loam 6
.'abash silty clay loam 15
tfall silt loam — 10
•.tfall silty clay loan 9
Windom loam- > 16
torn fine sandy loam 16
indom loamy fine sand, sandy sub-
stratum variant—
•
>— 10
Yordy loam— — 14
Yordy silty clay loam 12
Bu,
23
18
20
15
20
26
25
19
17
18
|4
16
15
12
20
24
22
20
20
16
24
18
19
14
21
20
20
18
13
26
10
21
18
17
23
23
15
18
18
Bu.
40
20
30
15
26
40
30
25
18
30
11
9
9
25
35
37
25
25
20
35
22
15
12
30
25
30
11
8
30
32
15
12
32
32
15
18
15
Bu.
45
35
40
20
30
45
40
30
30
35
18
15
15
15
30
40
45
35
35
30
45
30
25
25
35
35
35
20
20
45
• «
40
30
30
40
40
20
25
25
52
Table 1 (cont.)
Soil Types oat
:
:
B
Corn
A : B
:
Yordy loam, shallow phase
—
Yordy silty clay loam, shallow
phase——
Bu. Bu. Bu. _ja.
9 14 10 12
7 13 10 12
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Administration of federal farm programs has long been felt
to be done most effectively by local farmer committees. Such a
belief was based on concepts of freely elected administrators,
as well as the concept that individuals acquainted with the local
situation are best able to turn policy directives into action
programs
.
The system of farmer committees functioned quite well during
the early period of relatively simple and modestly restrictive
farm programs. However, as farm output has greatly outrun the de-
mand for farm products, federal legislation has turned to more
complex, restrictive type programs. This trend became apparent
with the Soil Bank Program vrhlch was initiated in 1956 and may
continue to an indefinite date.
Experience with the Soil Bank Program from 1956 to 1958 was
not over-complimentary to its administrators. Problems of drought
relief payments, unequal treatment of groups of individuals, and
instances of individuals completely by-passing the original intent
of the program have appeared to haunt its administrators. With
these events as past history, the possibility looms that farmer
committees may be unable to administer restrictive and complex
farm program most effectively.
The intent of this study was to determine how one program,
the Conservation Reserve for 1960, was administered in two coun-
ties. From the findings of these case studies it is possible that
some assessment of the abilities of farmer committees to handle
future farm programs may be possible.
The principal consideration of the case study of the I960
Conservation Reserve Program was to determine if production adjust-
ment was achieved. Furthermore, if reduction in total production
was effected, was the cost properly related to the results achieved.
Consideration was also given to the effectiveness with which the
county committees followed the regulations they received regard-
ing this program.
To determine if production adjustment at the proper cost was
achieved, three methods of comparisons were used. Soil map com-
parisons of the plots of land placed in the program were studied;
personal observations of the plots of land were made; and thirdly,
comparisons of the values of land obtained from tax records with
the values of the payments under the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram were conducted.
Soil maps were helpful in determining the classes of land
which were being placed in the program. Host of the land in this
study was class three or lovrer, with a predominance of the land
having poor soil characteri sties. If all farms in the counties
had been properly rated by the local committees, according to their
productivity, it would seem that a sample of the other classes of
land would have appeared In the program. This lack of better
quality land was partially explained, at least, by the lack of
variation in the range of classification of the land in the counties.
A majority of the land was classified as average, with the classi-
fication extending above average and below average only a nominal
distance, not sufficient to cover the actual range of productivity
of the farms. From this, it is possible to understand why more
productive land does not enter the Conservation Reserve, while
poorer quality land makes up the majority of land in the program*
The lack of range causes the better land to have insufficient
monetary inducement to be taken out of production, while the poorer
land has not only sufficient inducement but is actually over-com-
pensated for retiring it from production.
Personal visits to the farms with land actually in the pro-
gram confirmed the soil map observations. All land placed in the
program was of low productivity with only two farms in one county
being of average or above average in productivity. In one county
all the land in the program was definitely below average produc-
tivity. Much of the land was composed of rocky type soils, with
severe restrictions on its use due to serious erosion problems.
These facts would have caused such land to have a higher than
average cost of operation; and with a low productivity, the net
returns to this type land would be quite small. The Soil Bank
payment, which is to replace these net returns, was substantially
reater than the estimated net returns to such farms would have
been. Thus, the personal visits tended to illustrate that the
cost of the production adjustment achieved was too great.
The value of the land placed in the program compared to the
payments under the program tends to show a significant difference
between the higher quality or productivity land and the less pro-
ductive land. The tendency verified the lack of sufficient ra.
in the productivity index for which county committees were respons-
ible.
4The overall tendency of the study seemed to reveal that pro-
duction adjustment was being achieved but at greater than necessary
cost. Some of this overpayment seemed to be caused by the pro-
cedures which the county committees followed in setting the pro-
gram into action. However, it was also possible that much of the
estimated overpayment could have been caused by the regulations
which were sent to the county committees.
Signs of difficulty were apparent in the handling of this
program. If future farm programs become even more encompassin
,
complex, or restrictive, the farmer committee system may experi-
ence ever greater administrative problems.
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